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Abstract
We study the robustness verification problem for tree based models, including decision
trees, random forests (RFs) and gradient boosted decision trees (GBDTs). Formal robustness
verification of decision tree ensembles involves finding the exact minimal adversarial perturbation
or a guaranteed lower bound of it. Existing approaches find the minimal adversarial perturbation
by a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem, which takes exponential time so is
impractical for large ensembles. Although this verification problem is NP-complete in general,
we give a more precise complexity characterization. We show that there is a simple linear time
algorithm for verifying a single tree, and for tree ensembles the verification problem can be cast
as a max-clique problem on a multi-partite graph with bounded boxicity. For low dimensional
problems when boxicity can be viewed as constant, this reformulation leads to a polynomial
time algorithm. For general problems, by exploiting the boxicity of the graph, we develop an
efficient multi-level verification algorithm that can give tight lower bounds on robustness of
decision tree ensembles, while allowing iterative improvement and any-time termination. On
RF/GBDT models trained on 10 datasets, our algorithm is hundreds of times faster than the
previous approach that requires solving MILPs, and is able to give tight robustness verification
bounds on large GBDTs with hundreds of deep trees.
1 Introduction
Recent studies have demonstrated that neural network models are vulnerable to adversarial
perturbations—a small and imperceptible-to-human input perturbation can easily change the
predicted label [31, 15, 6, 13]. This has created serious security threats to many real applications
so it becomes important to formally verify the robustness of machine learning models. Usually,
the robustness verification problem can be cast as finding the minimal adversarial perturbation
to an input example that can change the predicted class label. A series of robustness verification
algorithms have been developed for neural network models [19, 32, 36, 35, 34, 38, 14, 29], where
efficient algorithms are mostly based on relaxation or approximation of nonlinear activation functions
of neural networks.
We study the robustness verification problem of tree-based models, including a single decision
tree and tree ensembles such as random forests (RFs) and gradient boosted decision trees (GBDTs).
These models have been widely used in practice and recent studies have demonstrated that both RFs
and GBDTs are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [18, 12, 8]. It is thus important to develop
a formal robustness verification algorithm for tree-based models. Robustness verification requires
computing the minimal adversarial perturbation. [18] showed that computing minimal adversarial
perturbation for tree ensemble is NP-complete in general, and they proposed a Mixed-Integer Linear
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Programming (MILP) approach to compute the minimal adversarial perturbation. Although exact
verification is NP-hard, in order to have an efficient verification algorithm for real applications we
seek to answer the following questions:
• Can we have efficient polynomial time algorithms for exact verification under some special
circumstances?
• For general tree ensemble models with a large number of trees, can we efficiently compute a
meaningful lower bounds on robustness while scaling to large tree ensembles?
In this paper, we answer the above-mentioned questions in the affirmative by formulating
the verification problem of tree ensemble as a graph problem. First, we show that for a single
decision tree, robustness verification can be done exactly in linear time. Then we show that for
an ensemble of K trees, the verification problem is equivalent to finding the maximum cliques in
a K-partite graph, and the graph is in a special form with boxicity equal to the input feature
dimension. Therefore, for low-dimensional problems, verification can also be done in polynomial
time with maximum clique searching algorithms. Finally, for large-scale tree ensembles, we propose
a multiscale verification algorithm by exploiting the boxicity of the graph, which can give tight
lower bounds on robustness. Furthermore, it supports any-time termination: we can stop the
algorithm at any time to obtain a reasonable lower bound given a computation time constraint.
Our proposed algorithm is efficient and is scalable to large tree ensemble models. For instance,
on a large multi-class GBDT with 200 trees robustly trained on the MNIST dataset (using [8]),
we obtained 78% verified robustness accuracy on test set with maximum `∞ perturbation  = 0.2
and the time used for verifying each test example is 12.6 seconds, whereas the MILP method uses
around 10 min for each test example.
2 Background and Related Work
Adversarial Robustness For simplicity, we consider a multi-class classification model f : Rd →
{1, . . . , C} where d is the input dimension and C is number of classes. For an input example x,
assuming that y0 = f(x) is the correct label, the minimal adversarial perturbation is defined
by
r∗ = min
δ
‖δ‖∞ s.t. f(x+ δ) 6= y0. (1)
Note that we focus on the `∞ norm measurement in this paper which is widely used in recent
studies [22, 36, 5]. Exactly solving (1) is usually intractable. For example, if f(·) is a neural
network, (1) is non-convex and [19] showed that solving (1) is NP-complete for ReLU networks.
Adversarial attacks are algorithms developed for finding a feasible solution δ¯ of (1), where
‖δ¯‖∞ is an upper bound of r∗. Many algorithms have been proposed for attacking machine learning
models [15, 20, 6, 22, 9, 10, 16, 3, 12, 24, 21]. Most practical attacks cannot reach the minimal
adversarial perturbation r∗ due to the non-convexity of (1). Therefore, attacking algorithms cannot
provide any formal guarantee on model robustness [1, 33].
On the other hand, robustness verification algorithms are designed to find the exact value
or a lower bound of r∗. An exact verifier needs to solve (1) to the global optimal, so typically we
resort to relaxed verifiers that give lower bounds. When a verification algorithm finds a lower bound
r, it guarantees that no adversarial example exists within a radius r ball around x. This is important
for deploying machine learning algorithms to safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles
or aircraft control systems [19, 17].
For verification, instead of solving (1) we can also solve the following decision problem of
robustness verification
Does there exist an x′ ∈ Ball(x, ) such that f(x) 6= y0? (2)
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Note that in our setting
Ball(x, ) := {x′ : ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ }
. If we can answer this decision problem, a binary search can give us the value of r∗, so the
complexity of (2) is in the same order of (1). Furthermore, a safe answer to (2) (always say
yes when unsure) will lead to a lower bound of r∗, which is what we want to do in verification.
The decision version is also widely used in the verification community since people care about
“robustness error at  perturbation” which is defined to be the ratio of number of test samples that
satisfy (2). Verification methods for neural networks have been studied extensively in the past few
years [36, 37, 35, 38, 29, 14, 30, 2].
Adversarial Robustness of Tree-based Models Unlike neural networks, decision-tree based
models are non-continuous step functions, and thus existing neural network verification algorithms
cannot be directly applied. To evaluate the robustness of tree-based models, [18] showed that
solving (1) for general tree ensemble models is NP-complete, so no polynomial time algorithm
can compute r∗ unless P=NP. A Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) algorithm was thus
proposed in [18] to compute (1) in exponential time. Some hard-label attacking algorithms for
neural networks, including the boundary attack [3] and OPT-attack [12], can also be applied since
they only require function evaluation of the non-smooth (hard-label) decision function f(·), and
can be viewed as faster ways to compute an upper bound of r∗. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no prior existing algorithm for efficient verification, or equivalently, efficiently
computing a lower bound of r∗ for ensemble trees.
3 Proposed Algorithm
In this section, we propose the first-ever tree ensemble verification algorithms. The tree ensemble
exact verification problem is NP-complete by its nature, and here we propose a series of efficient
verification algorithms for real applications. First, we will introduce a linear time algorithm for
exactly computing the minimal adversarial distortion r∗ for verifying a single decision tree. For
an ensemble of trees, we cast the verification problem into a max-clique searching problem in
K-partite graphs. For large-scale tree ensembles, we then propose an efficient multi-level algorithm
for verifying an ensemble of decision trees.
3.1 Exactly Verifying a Single Tree in Linear Time
Although computing r∗ for a tree ensemble is NP-complete [18], we show that a linear time
algorithm exists for finding the minimum adversarial perturbation and computing r∗ for a single
decision tree. We assume the decision tree has n nodes and the root node is indexed as 0. For
a given example x = [x1, . . . , xd] with d features, starting from the root, x traverses the decision
tree model until reaching a leaf node. Each internal node, say node i, has two children and a
feature-threshold pair (ti, ηi) to determine the traversal direction—x will be passed to the left child
if xti ≤ ηi and to the right child otherwise. Each leaf node has a value vi corresponding to the
predicted class label for a classification tree, or a real value for a regression tree.
Conceptually, the main idea of our single tree verification algorithm is to compute a d-
dimensional box for each leaf node such that any example in this box will fall into this leaf.
Mathematically, the node i’s box is defined as the Cartesian product Bi = (li1, ri1]× · · · × (lid, rid] of
d closed intervals on the real line. By definition, the root node has box [−∞,∞]× · · · × [−∞,∞]
and given the box of an internal node i, its children’s boxes can be obtained by changing only
one interval of the box based on the split condition (ti, ηi). More specifically, if p, q are node i’s
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left and right child node respectively, then we set their boxes Bp = (lp1, r
p
1 ] × · · · × (lpd, rpd] and
Bq = (lq1, r
q
1]× · · · × (lqd, rqd] by setting
(lpt , r
p
t ] =
{
(lit, r
i
t] if t 6= ti
(lit,min{rit, ηi}] if t = ti
, (lqt , r
q
t ] =
{
(lit, r
i
t] if t 6= ti
(max{lit, ηi}, rit] if t = ti.
(3)
After computing the boxes for internal nodes, we can also obtain the boxes for leaf nodes using (3).
Therefore computing the boxes for all the leaf nodes of a decision tree can be done by a depth-first
search traversal of the tree with time complexity O(nd).
With the boxes computed for each leaf node, the minimum perturbation required to change x
to go to a leaf node i can be written as a vector (x,Bi) ∈ Rd defined as
(x,Bi)t :=

0 if xt ∈ (lit, rit]
xt − rit if xt > rit
lit − xt if xt ≤ lit.
(4)
Then the minimal distortion can be computed as r∗ = mini:vi 6=y0 ‖(x,Bi)‖∞, where y0 is the
original label of x, and vi is the label for leaf node i. To find r∗, we check Bi for all leaves and
choose the smallest perturbation. This is a linear-time algorithm for exactly verifying the robustness
of a single decision tree.
In fact, this O(nd) time algorithm is used to illustrate the concept of “boxes” that will be used
later on for the tree ensemble case. If our final goal is to verify a single tree, we can have a more
efficient algorithm by combining the distance computation (4) in the tree traversal procedure, and
the resulting algorithm will take only O(n) time. This algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1 in the
appendix.
3.2 Verifying Tree Ensembles by Max-clique Enumeration
Now we discuss the robustness verification for tree ensembles. Assuming the tree ensemble has
K decision trees, we use S(k) to denote the set of leaf nodes of tree k and m(k)(x) to denote the
function that maps the input example x to the leaf node of tree k according to its traversal rule.
Given an input example x, the tree ensemble will pass x to each of these K trees independently and
x reaches K leaf nodes i(k) = m(k)(x) for all k = 1, . . . ,K. Each leaf node will assign a prediction
value vi(k) . For simplicity we start with the binary classification case, with x’s original label being
y0 = −1 and we want to turn it into +1. For binary classification the prediction of the tree ensemble
is computed by sign(
∑
k vi(k)), which covers both GBDTs and random forests, two widely used tree
ensemble models. Assume x has the label y0 = −1, that means sign(
∑
k vi(k)) < 0 for x, and our
task is to verify if the sign of the summation can be flipped within Ball(x, ).
We consider the decision problem of robustness verification (2). A naive analysis will need to
check all the points in Ball(x, ) which is uncountably infinite. To reduce the search space to finite,
we start by defining some notation: let C = {(i(1), . . . , i(K)) | i(k) ∈ S(k), ∀k = 1, . . . , L} to be all
the possible tuples of leaf nodes and let C(x) = [m(1)(x), . . . ,m(K)(x)] be the function that maps x
to the corresponding leaf nodes. Therefore, a tuple C ∈ C directly determines the model prediction∑
vC :=
∑
k vi(k) . Now we define a valid tuple for robustness verification:
Definition 1. A tuple C = (i(1), . . . , i(K)) is valid if and only if there exists an x′ ∈ Ball(x, ) such
that C = C(x′).
The decision problem of robustness verification (2) can then be written as:
Does there exist a valid tuple C such that
∑
vC > 0?
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Next, we show how to model the set of valid tuples. We have two observations. First, if a tuple
contains any node i with infx′∈Bi{‖x− x′‖∞} > , then it will be invalid. Second, there exists an
x such that C = C(x) if and only if Bi(1) ∩ · · · ∩Bi(K) 6= ∅, or equivalently:
(li
(1)
t , r
i(1)
t ] ∩ · · · ∩ (li
(K)
t , r
i(K)
t ] 6= ∅, ∀t = 1, . . . , d.
We show that the set of valid tuples can be represented as cliques in a graph G = (V,E), where
V := {i|Bi ∩ Ball(x, ) 6= ∅} and E := {(i, j)|Bi ∩Bj 6= ∅}. In this graph, nodes are the leaves of
all trees and we remove every leaf that has empty intersection with Ball(x, ). There is an edge
(i, j) between node i and j if and only if their boxes intersect. The graph will then be a K-partite
graph since there cannot be any edge between nodes from the same tree, and thus maximum cliques
in this graph will have K nodes. We define each part of the K-partite graph as Vk. Here a “part”
means a disjoint and independent set in the K-partite graph. The following lemma shows that
intersections of boxes have very nice properties:
Lemma 1. For boxes B1, . . . , BK , if Bi ∩Bj 6= ∅ for all i, j ∈ [K] then B1 ∩B2 ∩ · · · ∩BK 6= ∅
and their intersection will also be an nonempty box: B¯ = B1 ∩B2 ∩ · · · ∩BK .
The proof can be found in the appendix. Based on the above lemma, each K-clique (fully
connected subgraph with K nodes) in G can be viewed as a set of leaf nodes that has nonempty
intersection with each other and also have nonempty intersection with Ball(x, ), so the intersection
of those K boxes and Ball(x, ) will be a nonempty box, which implies each K-clique corresponds
to a valid tuple of leaf nodes:
Lemma 2. A tuple C = (i(1), . . . , i(K)) is valid if and only if nodes i(1), . . . , i(K) form a K-clique
(maximum clique) in graph G constructed above.
Therefore the robustness verification problem can be formulated as
Is there a maximum clique C in G such that
∑
vC > 0? (5)
This reformulation indicates that the tree ensemble verification problem can be solved by an efficient
maximum clique enumeration algorithm. Some standard maximum clique searching algorithms can
be applied here to perform verification:
• Finding K-cliques in K-partite graphs: Any algorithm for finding all the maximum cliques
in G can be used. The classic B-K backtracking algorithm [4] takes O(3
m
3 ) time to find all the
maximum cliques where m is the number of nodes in G. Furthermore, since our graph is a
K-partite graph, we can apply some specialized algorithms designed for finding all the K-cliques
in K-partite graphs [23, 25, 28].
• Polynomial time algorithms exist for low-dimensional problems: Another important
property for graph G is that each node in G is a d-dimensional box and each edge indicates
intersection of two boxes. This implies our graph G is with “boxicity d” (see [7] for detail). [7]
proved that the number of maximum cliques will only be O((2m)d) and it is able to find the
maximum weight clique in O((2m)d) time. Therefore, for problems with very small d, the time
complexity for verification is actually polynomial.
Therefore we can exactly solve the tree ensemble verification problem using algorithms for
maximum cliques searching in K-partite graph, and its time complexity is found to be as follows:
Theorem 1. Exactly verifying the robustness of a K-tree ensemble with at most n leaves per tree
and d dimensional features takes min{O(nK), O((2Kn)d)} time.
This is a direct consequence of the fact that the number of K-cliques in a K-partite graph with
n vertices per part is bounded by O(nK), and number of maximum cliques in a graph with a total
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Tree (1)
1 2 3
Tree (2)
5 6 7
Tree (3)
9 10 11
Tree (4)
13 164 8 12 14 15Leaf nodes
3, 6 4, 8 12, 14 12, 15
Merge (1) and (2) Merge (3) and (4)
Merge (1) (2) and (3) (4)
3, 6, 12, 14 4, 8, 12, 15 Final (exact) solution
Run single-level algorithm 
to get level 1 bound
Run single-level algorithm 
to get level 2 bound
Figure 1: The proposed multi-level verification algorithm. Lines between leaf node i on tree t1 and
leaf node j on t2 indicate that their `∞ feature boxes intersect (i.e., there exists an input such that
tree 1 predicts vi and tree 2 predicts vj).
of m vertices with boxicity d is O((2m)d). For a general graph, since K and d can be in O(n) and
O(m) [27], it can still be exponential. But the theorem gives a more precise characterization for
the complexity of the verification problem for tree ensembles.
Based on the nice properties of maximum cliques searching problem, we propose a simple and
elegant algorithm that enumerates all K-cliques on a K-partite graph with a known boxicity d in
Algorithm 2 in the appendix, and we can use this algorithm for tree ensemble verification when the
number of trees or the dimension of features is small.
3.3 An Efficient Multi-level Algorithm for Verifying the Robustness of
a Tree Ensemble
Practical tree ensembles usually have tens or hundreds of trees and with large dimensions, so
Algorithm 2 will take exponential time and will be too slow. We thus develop an efficient multi-level
algorithm for computing verification bounds by further exploiting the boxicity of the graph.
Figure 1 illustrates the graph and how our multilevel algorithm runs. There are four trees and
each tree has four leaf nodes. A node is colored if it has nonempty intersection with Ball(x, );
uncolored nodes are discarded. To answer question (5), we need to compute the maximum
∑
vC
among all K-cliques, denoted by v∗. As mentioned before, for robustness verification we only need
to compute an upper bound of v∗ in order to get a lower bound of minimal adversarial robustness.
In the following, we will first discuss algorithms for computing an upper bound at the top level,
and then show how our multi-scale algorithm iterative refines this bound until reaching the exact
solution v∗.
Bounds for a single level. To compute an upper bound of v∗, a naive approach is to assume
that the graph is fully connected between independent sets (fully connected K-partite graph) and
in this case the maximum sum of node values will be the sum of the maximum value of each
independent set: ∑K
k=1
maxi∈S(k) vi ≥ v∗. (6)
One can easily show this is an upper bound of v∗ since any original K-clique will still be considered
when we add more edges to the graph.
Another slightly better approach is to exploit the edge information but only between tree t and
t+ 1. If we search over all the length-K paths [i(1), . . . , i(K)] from the first to the last group and
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define the value of a path to be
∑
k vi(k) , then the maximum valued path will be a upper bound of
v∗. This can be computed in linear time using dynamic programming. We scan nodes from tree 1
to tree K, and for each node we store a value di which is the maximum value of paths from tree 1
to this node. At tree k and node i, the di value can be computed by
di = vi + max
j:j∈S(k−1) and (j,i)∈E
dj . (7)
Taking the max d value in the last tree will give us a tighter upper bound of v∗.
Merging T independent sets Now we try to refine our bound. Our approach is to partition
the graph into K/T groups, each with T independent sets. Within each group, we find all the
T -cliques and use a new “pseudo node” to represent each T -clique. T -cliques in a K-partite graph
can be enumerated efficiently if we choose T to be a relative small number (e.g., 2 or 3 in the
experiments).
Now we exploit the boxicity property of our graph to form a graph among these cliques
(illustrated as the second level nodes in Figure 1). By Lemma 1, we know that the intersection of T
boxes will still be a box, so each T -clique is still a box and can be represented as a pseudo node in
the level-2 graph. Also because each pseudo node is still a box, we can easily form edges between
pseudo nodes to indicate the nonempty overlapping between them and this will be a K/T -partite
boxicity graph since no edge can be formed for the cliques within the same group. Thus we get the
level-2 graph. With the level-2 graph, we can again run the single level algorithm to compute a
upper bound on v∗ to get a lower bound of r∗ in (1), but different from the level-1 graph, now we
already considered all the within-group edges so the value we get will be less or equal to the level-1
bound, which means tighter.
The overall multi-level framework We can run the algorithm level by level until merging all
the groups into one, and in the final level the pseudo nodes will correspond to the K-cliques in the
original graph, and the maximum value will be exactly v∗. Therefore, our algorithm can be viewed
as an anytime algorithm that refines the upper bound level-by-level until reaching the maximum
value. Although getting to the final level still requires exponential time, in practice we can stop at
any level (denoted as L) and get a reasonable bound. In experiments, we will show that by merging
few trees we already get a bound very close to the final solution. Algorithm 3 in the appendix gives
the complete procedure.
Handling multi-class tree ensembles For a multiclass classification problem, say C-class
classification problem, C groups of tree ensembles and each withK trees are built for the classification
task; for the k-th tree in group c, prediction outcome is denoted as i(k,c) = m(k,c)(x) where m(k,c)(x)
is the function that maps the input example x to a leaf node of tree k in group c. The final
prediction is given by argmaxc
∑
k vi(k,c) . Given an input example x with ground-truth class c
and an attack target class c′, we extract 2K trees for class c and class c′, and flip the sign of all
prediction values for trees in group c′, such that initially
∑
t vi(t,c) +
∑
t vi(t,c′) < 0 for a correctly
classified example. Then, we are back to the binary case with 2K trees, and can still apply our
multi-level framework to obtain a lower bound r(c,c′) of r∗(c,c′) for this target attack pair (c, c
′).
Robustness of an untargeted attack can be evaluated by taking r = minc′ 6=c r(c,c′).
3.4 Verification Problems Beyond Ordinary Robustness
The above discussions focus on the decision problem of `∞ robustness verification (2). In fact, our
approach works for a more general verification problem for any d-dimensional box B:
Is there any x′ ∈ B such that f(x) 6= y0? (8)
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In typical robustness verification settings, B is defined to be Ball(x, ) but in fact we can allow any
boxes in our algorithm. For a general B, Lemma 1 still holds so all of our algorithms and analysis
can go through. The only thing we need to change is to compute the intersection between B and
each box of leaf node at the first level in Figure 1 to eliminate nodes that have empty intersection
with B. So robustness verification is just a special case where we remove all the nodes with empty
intersection with Ball(x, ). For example, if we want to identify a set S of unimportant variables,
where any change in S cannot alter the prediction for a given sample x, then we can choose B as
Bi = [−∞,∞] if i ∈ S and Bi = {xi} otherwise. Similarly, we can also compute a set of anchor
features (similar to [26]) such that once a set of features are fixed, any perturbation outside the set
cannot change the prediction.
4 Experiments
We evaluate our proposed method for ensemble tree robustness verification on two tasks: binary and
multiclass classification on 10 public datasets including both small and large scale datasets1. The
statistics of the data sets are shown in the appendix. As we defined in Section 2, r∗ is the radius of
minimum adversarial perturbation that reflects true model robustness, but is hard to obtain; our
method finds r that is a lower bound of r∗, which guarantees that no adversarial example exists
within radius r. A high quality lower bound r should be close to r∗. We include the following
algorithms in our comparisons:
• Cheng’s attack [12] provides results on adversarial attacks on these models, which gives an upper
bound of the model robustness r∗. We denote it as r and r ≥ r∗.
• MILP: an MILP based method [18] gives the exact r∗. MILP is proposed for adversarial attacks
on tree ensembles and thus r∗ ≥ r always holds for all lower bounds. MILP needs to solve a
Mixed Integer Linear Program to find r∗ and runs in exponential time, and is slow when the
number of trees or dimension of the features increases.
• LP relaxed MILP: a Linear Programming (LP) relaxed MILP formulation by directly changing all
binary variables to continuous ones. Since the constraints are removed, solving the minimization
of MILP gives a lower bound of robustness, rLP , serving as a baseline method.
• Our proposed multi-level verification framework in Section 3.3 (with pseudo code as Algorithm 3
in the appendix). We are targeting to compute robustness interval rours for tree ensemble
verification.
In Tables 1 and 2 we show empirical comparisons on these 10 datasets. We consider `∞
robustness, and normalize our datasets to [0, 1] such that perturbations on different datasets are
comparable. We include both standard (naturally trained) GBDT models (Table 1) and robust
GBDT models (Table 2) in [8]. The robust GBDTs try to optimize the model performance under
the worst-case perturbation of input features, which leads to a max-min saddle point problem when
finding the split at each node. All GBDTs are implemented under XGBoost framework [11]. The
number of trees in GBDT and parameters used in training GBDT for different datasets are shown
in Table 3 in the appendix. Because we solve the decision problem of robustness verification, we
use 10 times binary search to find the largest r in all experiments, and the reported time is the
total time including all binary search trials. We present the average of r or r∗ over 500 examples.
The MILP based method from [18] is an accurate but very slow method; the results marked with
an asterisk (“*”) in the table have very long running time and thus we only evaluate 50 examples
instead of 500.
From Tables 1 and 2 we can see that our method gives a tight lower bound r compared to r∗
from MILP, while achieving up to ∼ 3000X speedup on large models. The running time of the
baseline LP relaxation, however, is on the same order of magnitude as the MILP method, but the
1 Our code (XGBoost compatible) is available at https://github.com/chenhongge/treeVerification.
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Dataset Cheng’s attack [12] MILP [18] LP relaxation Ours Ours vs. MILPavg. r avg. time avg. r∗ avg. time avg. rLP avg. time T L avg. r∗ avg. time rour/r∗ speedup
breast-cancer .221 2.18s .210 .012s .064 .009s 2 1 .208 .001s .99 12X
covtype .058 4.76s .028∗ 355∗s .005∗ 154∗s 2 3 .022 3.39s .79 105X
cod-rna .054 2.13s .035 .485s .017 .222s 2 3 .033 .059s .94 8.2X
diabetes .064 1.70s .049 .061s .015 .026s 3 2 .042 .018s .86 3.4X
Fashion-MNIST .048 12.2s .014∗ 1150∗s .003∗ 898∗s 2 1 .012 11.8s .86 97X
HIGGS .015 3.80s .0028∗ 68∗min .00035∗ 50∗min 4 1 .0022 1.29s .79 3163X
ijcnn1 .047 2.72s .030 4.64s .008 2.67s 2 2 .026 .101s .87 4.6X
MNIST .070 11.1s .011∗ 367∗s .003∗ 332∗s 2 2 .011 5.14s 1.00 71X
webspam .027 5.83s .00076 47.2s .0002 39.7s 2 1 .0005 .404s .66 117X
MNIST 2 vs. 6 .152 12.0s .057 23.0s .016 11.6s 4 1 .046 .585s .81 39X
Table 1: Average `∞ distortion over 500 examples and average verification time per example for
three verification methods. Here we evaluate the bounds for standard (natural) GBDT models.
Results marked with an asterisk (“*”) are the averages of 50 examples due to long running time. T
is the number of independent sets and L is the number of levels in searching cliques used in our
algorithm. A ratio rour/r∗ close to 1 indicates better lower bound quality.
Dataset Cheng’s attack [12] MILP [18] LP relaxation Ours Ours vs. MILPavg. r avg. time avg. r∗ avg. time avg. rLP avg. time T L avg. r∗ avg. time rour/r∗ speedup
breast-cancer .404 1.96s .400 .009s .078 .008s 2 1 .399 .001s 1.00 9X
covtype .079 .481s .046∗ 305∗s .0053∗ 159∗s 2 3 .032 4.84s .70 63X
cod-rna .062 2.02s .055 .607s .017 .410s 2 3 .052 .104s .95 5.8X
diabetes .137 1.52s .112 .034s .035 .013s 3 2 .109 .006s .97 5.7X
Fashion-MNIST .153 13.9s .091∗ 41∗min .009∗ 34∗min 2 1 .071 18.0s .78 137X
HIGGS .023 3.58s .0084∗ 59∗min .00031∗ 54∗min 4 1 .0063 1.41s .75 2511X
ijcnn1 .054 2.63s .036 2.52s .009 1.26s 2 2 .032 0.58s .89 4.3X
MNIST .367 1.41s .264∗ 615∗s .019∗ 515∗s 2 2 .253 12.6s .96 49X
webspam .048 4.97s .015 83.7s .0024 60.4s 2 1 .011 .345s .73 243X
MNIST 2 vs. 6 .397 17.2s .313 91.5s .039 40.0s 4 1 .308 3.68s .98 25X
Table 2: Average `∞ distortion over 500 examples and average verification time per example for
three verification methods and an attack method. Here we evaluate the bounds for robustly
trained models introduced in [8]. Results marked with an asterisk (“*”) are the averages of 50
examples due to long running time. T is the number of independent sets and L is the number of
levels in searching cliques used in our algorithm. A ratio rour/r∗ close to 1 indicates better lower
bound quality.
results are much worse, with rLP  r∗. Our proposed method given as Algorithm 3 is a multi-scale
any-time approach, that is, it can stop at any scale to get a reasonable robustness bound. Figure 2
shows how the tightness of our robustness verification lower bounds changes with different size
of clique per level (T ) and different number of levels (L). We test on a 20-tree standard GBDT
model on the diabetes dataset. Here we also show the exact bound r∗ by the MILP method. Our
verification bound converges to the MILP bound as more levels of clique enumerations are used.
Also, when we find larger cliques within each level, the bound becomes tighter.
To show the scalability of our method, we vary the number of trees in GBDT and compare per
example running time with MILP method on ijcnn1 dataset in Figure 3. We see that our proposed
methods spend much less time on each example compared to the MILP method and their running
time grows slower than MILP when the number of trees increases.
In Section 3.4, we showed that the proposed algorithm works for a more general verification
problem such as how to identify unimportant features in the data, where any change on those
features cannot change the prediction. Here we use MNIST data as an example for this task
where we perturb pixels (features) on MNIST test images on both standard and robustly trained
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Figure 2: Robustness bounds obtained with different pa-
rameters (T = {2, 3, 4}, L = {1, · · · , 6}) on a 20-tree
standard GBDT model with the diabetes dataset (left)
and a 20-tree robust GBDT model with the ijcnn1 dataset
(right). rour converges to r∗ as L increases.
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Figure 3: Running time of MILP and our
method on GBDT model with different
number of trees on the ijcnn1 dataset.
multi-class decision trees with depth 8. In Figure 4, yellow pixels cannot change prediction for any
perturbation and a darker pixel represents a smaller lower bound of perturbation to change the
model output using that pixel. The standard naturally trained model has some very dark pixels
compared to the robust model.
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Figure 4: Identifying important pixels on 3 MNIST images. Left: digit image; Middle: standard
GBDT model; Right: robust GBDT model. Changing one of any yellow pixels cannot change
prediction; pixels in darker colors tend to affect model prediction more than pixels in lighter colors.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. If we have K one dimensional intervals I1 = (l1, r1], I2 = (l2, r2], . . . , IT = (lK , rK ], we want to
prove if every pair of them have nonempty overlap I1 ∩ · · · ∩ IK 6= ∅. This can be proved by the following.
Without loss of generality we assume l1 ≤ l2 ≤ · · · ≤ lK . For each k < K, Ik ∩ IK 6= ∅ implies lK < rk.
Therefore, (lT ,min(r1, r2, . . . , rK)] will be a nonempty set that is contained in I1, I2, . . . , IK . Therefore
I1 ∩ I2 ∩ · · · ∩ IK 6= ∅ and it is another interval.
This can be generalized to d-dimensional boxes. Assume we have boxes B1, . . . , BK such that Bi∩Bj 6= ∅
for any i and j. Then for each dimension we can apply the above proof, which implies that B1∩B2∩· · ·∩BK 6=
∅ and the intersection will be another box.
B Data Statistics and Model Parameters in Tables 1 and 2
Table 3 presents data statistics and parameters for the models in Tables 1 and 2 in the main text. The
standard test accuracy is the model accuracy on natural, unmodified test sets.
Dataset training test # of # of # of robust depth standard test acc.set size set size features classes trees  robust natural robust natural
breast-cancer 546 137 10 2 4 0.3 8 6 .978 .964
covtype 400,000 181,000 54 7 80 0.2 8 8 .847 .877
cod-rna 59,535 271,617 8 2 80 0.2 5 4 .880 .965
diabetes 614 154 8 2 20 0.2 5 5 .786 .773
Fashion-MNIST 60,000 10,000 784 10 200 0.1 8 8 .903 .903
HIGGS 10,500,000 500,000 28 2 300 0.05 8 8 .709 .760
ijcnn1 49,990 91,701 22 2 60 0.1 8 8 .959 .980
MNIST 60,000 10,000 784 10 200 0.3 8 8 .980 .980
webspam 300,000 50,000 254 2 100 0.05 8 8 .983 .992
MNIST 2 vs. 6 11,876 1,990 784 2 1000 0.3 6 4 .997 .998
Table 3: The data statistics and parameters for the models presented in Tables 1 and 2.
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C An O(n) time algorithm for verifying a decision tree
The robustness of a single tree can be easily verified by the following O(n) algorithm, which traverse the
whole tree and computes the bounding boxes for each node in a depth-first search fashion.
Algorithm 1: Linear time `∞ untargeted attack for a decision tree.
1 Initial p∗ = 0, `t = −∞, rt =∞, ∀t = 1, . . . d;
2 ComputeRecursive(0, 0);
3 Function ComputeRecursive(i, p)
4 if i is leaf node then
5 if vi 6= y0 then
6 p∗ ← min(p∗, p);
7 else
/* Checking conditions for the left child */
8 s← rti ;
9 rti ← min(rti , Iti) ;
10 if lti ≤ rti then
11 if rti < xti then
12 ComputeRecursive(i.left_child, max(p, |xti − rti |))
13 else
14 ComputeRecursive(i.left_child, p) ;
15 rti ← s;
/* Checking conditions for the right child */
16 s← lti ;
17 lti ← max(lti , Iti) ;
18 if lti ≤ rti then
19 if lti > xti then
20 ComputeRecursive(i.right_child, max(p, |xti − lti |))
21 else
22 ComputeRecursive(i.right_child, p) ;
23 end
D Clique Enumeration Algorithm
The algorithm first looks at any first two parts V1 and V2 of the graph and enumerates all 2-cliques in
O(|V1||V2|) time. Then, each 2-clique found is converted into a “pseudo node” (this is possible due to
Lemma 1), and all 2-cliques form a new part V ′2 of the graph. Then we replace V1 and V2 with V ′2 , and
continue to enumerate all 2-cliques between V ′2 and V3 to form V ′3 . A 2-clique between V ′2 and V3 represents
a 3-clique in V1, V2 and V3 due to boxicity. Note that enumerating all 3-cliques in a general 3-partite
graph takes O(|V1||V2||V3|) time; thanks to boxicity, our algorithm takes O(|V ′2 ||V3|) time which equals to
O(|V1||V2||V3|) only when V1 and V2 form a complete bipartite graph, which is unlikely in common cases.
This process continues recursively until we process all K parts and have only V ′K left, where each vertex
in V ′K represents a K-clique in the original graph. After obtaining all K-cliques, we can verify each to
14
compute verification bound.
Algorithm 2: Enumerating all K-cliques on a K-partite graph with a known boxicity d
1 Initial V1, V2, , . . . , VK ;
2 for k ← 1, 2, 3, . . . , K do
3 Uk ← {(Ai, Bi(k))|i(k) ∈ Vk, Ai = {i(k)}};
/* A is a set of the nodes in a clique. */
/* Here Uk is a set of 1-cliques. */
4 end
5 CliqueEnumerate(U1, U2, , . . . , UK);
6 Function CliqueEnumerate(U1, U2, , . . . , UK)
7 V ′1 ← U1;
8 for k ← 2, 3, . . . , K do
9 V ′k ← ∅;
10 for (A, B) ∈ V ′k−1 do
11 for (Aˆ, Bˆ) ∈ Uk do
12 if B ∩ Bˆ 6= ∅ then
/* A clique is found, add it as a pseudo node with the intersection
of two boxes */
13 V ′k ← V ′k ∪ {(A ∪ Aˆ, B ∩ Bˆ)};
14 end
15 end
16 end
17 return V ′K ;
18 end
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E Multi-level Verification Framework
Algorithm 3 presents our multi-level decision tree verification framework describe in Section 3.3.
Algorithm 3: Multi-level verification framework
1 Initial V1, V2, , . . . , VK ; maximum number of independent sets in a group: T ; maximum number of
levels: L, L ≤ logT (K);
2 MultiLevelVerify(V1, V2, , . . . , VK);
3 Function MultiLevelVerify(V1, V2, , . . . , VK)
4 for k ← 1, 2, 3, . . . , K do
5 U (0)k ← {(Ai, Bi
(k)
)|i(k) ∈ Vk, Ai = {i(k)}};
/* A is a set of the nodes in a clique */
6 end
7 for l← 1, 2, . . . , L do
8 for k ← 0, 1, . . . , bK/T lc do
9 U (l)k ← CliqueEnumerate(U (l−1)kT+1, U (l−1)kT+2, . . . , U (l−1)(k+1)T−1)
10 end
11 end
12 for k ← 0, 1, . . . , bK/TLc do
13 for (A, B) ∈ U (L)k do
14 vi ← sum of the values corresponding to all leaves in A.
15 end
16 end
17 Run the dynamic programming method in (7) for v∗.
18 end
16
